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Abstract:  Suppose you are interested in the level of a state variable (e.g. a disease is 
present or absent or of a pre-specified level of severity, or a failure is recorded or 
not, etc.) and have a potentially useful but imperfect diagnostic test method, (e.g. a 
blood test result for this disease, or a quality control check for manufacturing 
defects, is either definitely positive or not). How do you interpret the result of the 
diagnostic test for the level of the state variable when some or all of the 
information underlying the inference is ambiguous (imprecise)? This publication 
for the Wolfram Demonstration project is designed to facilitate the "what-if" 
exploration of the effects of ambiguities (imprecision) in sensitivity, specificity, 
and base rate information, alone or in combination, on posterior inferences through 
a linked tabular natural frequency and graphical probability format representation 
of underlying uncertainties. The textual description explains the underlying theory 
of boundedly rational inference. An appendix contains the full Mathematica code 
used to implement the interactive software that implements and explains the 
underlying theory.  
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Probabilities are Imprecise 
 
Introduction 
Suppose you are interested in the level of a state variable, such as whether a disease is 
present or absent or of a pre-specified level of severity, or goods being manufactured 
have a quality defect, and so on. The case of the disease could be whether a male has 
prostate cancer. The quality defect could be faulty accelerator pedal in an automobile. 
Say also that you have access to a potentially useful but imperfect diagnostic test 
method. For prostate cancer this could be the prostate-specific antigen test and 
whether the test is above a pre-specified limit. For defects in accelerator pedals this 
could be random sampling checks of the working of the accelerator pedals and 
whether they are outside pre-specified tolerance limits. An important question for 
someone making decisions with information from a diagnostic test is how do you 
interpret the result of the diagnostic test for the level of the state variable when the 
some or all of the information underlying the inference is ambiguous (imprecise)?
1
  
 
The Problem 
Let S be the logical truth value (1 or 0) of a proposition about the state variable. In the 
examples previously mentioned this would be whether prostate cancer is present 
(S=1) or absent (S=0), or even of a pre-specified level of severity, or goods being 
manufactured have quality defects (S=1) or not (S=0). Let D be the logical truth value 
of a proposition about the outcome of an imperfect diagnostic test for the state. For 
example, whether the prostate-specific antigen test result is above a pre-specified limit 
(D=1) or not (D=0). Then our question is, in the language of statistics: how do (and 
should) people conceptualize and calculate a posterior inference about S after having 
observed some D, when some or all of the underlying information about D, about S, 
                                                 
1
 See Nau (2007) or Mukerji (2009) for discussions about ambiguity, as well as  its impact on decisions 
made under uncertainty. 
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and about the relationship between D and S is ambiguous (imprecise)?  
 
From a statistical perspective there are three precise numerical inputs that feed into 
coherent posterior inferences about binary valued S after having observed the result of 
the binary valued diagnostic signal D: a sensitivity number, a specificity number, 
and a base rate number. The first two numbers characterize uncertainty about the 
results of the diagnostic D under two different information conditions about the state 
S. The sensitivity number expresses uncertainty about whether the diagnostic test D 
will be positive, that is D=1, assuming that S=1 is true. The specificity number 
expresses an uncertainty about whether the diagnostic test D for S=1 will be negative, 
that is D=0, assuming that S=0 is true. The third number, the base rate number, 
characterizes uncertainty about the binary state variable S in the absence of, or prior 
to knowing, any diagnostic information D.  
 
These numerically precise inputs can be presented in a variety of logically equivalent 
frames or formats to someone who wishes to make posterior inferences about the state 
variable S. Two stylized facts are known: (1) a majority of ordinary yet intelligent 
people, lay and professional alike, do not perform the posterior inference task well 
and (2) these same people typically do worse when information on the three numbers 
is presented in the standard probability formats favoured by statisticians compared to 
natural frequency formats favoured by behavioural psychologists (see for example 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) or Edwards and Gigerenzer (2003)). Sometimes tabular 
and graphical means of communicating the relevant numerical information along with 
conventional descriptive textual methods are helpful decision aids in either format, 
although they are by no means panaceas for the problem. Yet virtually all research 
into the problem of statistical innumeracy and the potential solutions of alternative 
formatting aids ignores the problem of ambiguity. Research shows that decision 
makers recognize the inherent incompleteness underlying the numerical information 
presented, no matter what the format, even if they don't know exactly how to 
incorporate these ambiguities into their inferences. This interactive Demonstration is 
designed to facilitate the "what-if" exploration of the effects of ambiguities 
(imprecision) in sensitivity, specificity, and base rate information, alone or in 
combination, on posterior inferences through a linked tabular natural frequency and 
graphical probability format representation of underlying uncertainties. 
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The Mathematica Demonstration Tool 
The table and the graphic in the Demonstration are set up in the following way (see 
Figure 1). The truth table in the Demonstration shows the four logical possibilities for 
the two propositions S and D being true or false together. Frequencies or counts 
(hypothetical, although possibly based on some direct observations)  for each of the 
four logical possibilities in the columns (cells) are specified initially so that for 20 out 
of 100 the proposition S is true, S=1, while for 80 out of 100 the proposition S is 
false, S=0. This, gives a base rate for the truth of the proposition S of 20 out of 100, 
or 20%, shown as a triangle on the x-axis at 0.2 in the figure. 
 
Initially the sensitivity of the diagnostic test is set at 16 out of 20 or 80%, shown as a 
circle on the right hand margin of the graph; that is, of the 20 cases where S is true, 
S=1, 16 also show a positive diagnostic result, D=1. Initially the specificity of the test 
is set at 56 out of 80, or 70%, shown as a circle at a height of 30% , 100%-70%, on 
the left hand margin of the graph: that is, of the 80 cases where S is false, S=0, 56 
don't have a positive diagnostic, but 24 or 30% do. The resulting precise posterior 
probability for S being true given a positive diagnostic, P(S|D), is 40% or 0.4 in a 
probability format or 16 out of 40 (from 16+24 cases where D=1) in a natural 
frequency format, shown as a large square box on the x-axis top margin. A 
corresponding smaller square on the x-axis along the bottom margin finds the level of 
the other posterior probability, P(S|D=0). This is the posterior probability for S being 
true given a diagnostic outcome that is not positive. The graphic deliberately does not 
focus on this posterior inference, as we are concentrating attention on the question: 
how should one interpret a positive diagnostic signal, or D=1? Note that there is a 
third probability, the base rate or the (unconditional probability) for the diagnostic 
signal, here 16+24=40 out of 100, or 40%, which can also be calculated given the 
sensitivity, specificity, and base rate numbers. 
 
There are many interesting probability assessments in this simple model, but only 
three logically independent ones. The dotted and dashed lines in the figure are two 
linear constraints on a coherent inference process. There are two “base rates”, P(S) 
and P(D), one for the state variable S and one for the diagnostic test D. P(S) is the 
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Figure 1: The Interface with the Initial conditions. 
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marginal or unconditional probability of the proposition that S is true, S=1, or 
equivalently that the underlying state variable is at the pre-specified level. P(D) is the 
marginal or unconditional probability for the diagnostic test result being positive, or 
equivalently that D=1 is true. It is important to recognize that these base rates are not 
logically independent of one another. The chances that S is true, S=1, written as 
P(S=1) or in shorthand P(S), is a weighted average of the chances of S being true with 
a positive diagnostic, P(S|D=1), and the chances of S being true with a nonpositive 
diagnostic, or P(S|D=0). The corresponding weights are the chances P(D=1) of a 
positive diagnostic and the chances of a non-positive diagnostic, P(D=0)=1-P(D=1), 
that is: 
  P(S) = P(S|D=1)*P(D=1) + P(S|D=0)*P(D=0). 
The dotted/dashed line between the squares is all combinations of {P(S),P(D)} that 
satisfy this equation for the given endpoints, which are conditional probabilities. At 
the same time, the base rate or marginal probability P(D) for positive diagnostic 
results must be an appropriate weighted average of positive diagnostic results when S 
is true (sensitivity) and the positive diagnostic results when S is false (1 minus 
specificity) : that is, 
 P(D) = P(D|S=1)*P(S=1) + P(D|S=0)*P(S=0). 
The dotted/dashed line between the two circles plots all pairs {P(S),P(D)} 
satisfying this relationship. The intersection of the two lines solves for the unique pair 
of base rates for S and D, {P(S),P(D)}, that satisfies both linear relationships. 
  
Changing any of the three components of one of the linear relationships means the 
components of the other relationships change as well. The Demonstration is set up so 
that the endpoints (capturing the sensitivity and the specificity settings) and base rate 
along the dotted/dashed line between the two circles can be changed by the sliders, 
and the endpoints of the corresponding changes in the dotted/dashed line between 
the two squares trace out the relevant posterior inferences, P(S|D=1) and P(S|D=0), 
with the emphasis on the former. There are two sets of sliders, one for reference 
purposes, the other to examine the impacts of changes in the underlying sensitivity, 
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specificity and base rate information, either separately or jointly. For example, 
starting out with the initial values of sensitivity of 80%, specificity of 70% and base 
rate of 20%, changing one or all of the top set of three sliders alters the posterior 
inferences - but leaves visible the reference specifications.  
 
Figure 2 shows an example of the influence changes in the base rate have  on the 
posterior inference P(S|D=1). Reducing the base rate of S from 20 out of 100 to 
roughly 5 out of 100 decreases the chances of S being true with a positive diagnostic 
by a factor of over 3, from 40% to around 12%. Take the case of a diagnostic test for 
a serious disease, where the diagnostic test is a highly sensitive (80%) test – in this 
case it is capable of correctly detecting 8 out of 10  situations where the disease is 
actually present – and also has good specificity (70%) – in this case it is capable of 
correctly identifying 7 out of 10 cases where the disease is not present. The posterior 
chances of having the  disease after observing a positive diagnostic test result are 
quite small, when the base rate of the disease is small. The “reason” is evident from 
the tabular representation. There are 29+4=33 cases of a positive diagnostic test, but 
of these, 29 out of 33, around 88%, are false positives. The specificity imperfection of 
the test, a 30% false alarm rate, when applied to many healthy cases, here 95, creates 
many more false positive test results than the 4 out of 5 true positive test results. 
 
To drive this point home, comparing Figure 3 below with Figure 1 shows the effect on 
the posterior inference of improving the specificity of the diagnostic test, here from 
70% to 93%. Note we are keeping the base rate level at 20%. The (red) dotted dashed 
lines joining the circles show the before and after linear constraints – the sensitivity 
has not changed so the right hand circle (PD|S=1) is the same for both constraints, but 
the specificity (left hand margin circles) have changed. The effect on the posterior 
inference P(S|D=1) is dramatic – the chances of having the disease as a result of 
observing a positive diagnostic test have almost doubled, from 40% to 75%. The 
tabular natural frequency representations in both Figures 1 and 3 show why: the 
number of false positives drops from 24 out of 80 to 5 out of 80. 
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Figure 2: The Effect on P(S|D=1) of Reducing the Base Rate of the Disease. 
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Figure 3: The Effect on Posterior Inferences P(S|D=1) of Changing the Specificity of 
the Test. 
 10 
Summary 
 
Everyday, people have to make important decisions in risky situations. These can 
include whether to undertake costly medical treatments for potential diseases, or to 
incur the costs of shutting down production lines for maintenance or replacement of 
machinery to avoid product quality defects, or to incur costs from shutting down a 
nuclear reactor to prevent excessive strain on the pressure vessel or in the worst case 
the uncontrolled release of radioactive material. In all these situations, diagnostic tests 
or their equivalent are available about the state variables of interest, however 
imperfect the information from the tests may be. Making decisions based on these 
tests is problematic when information underlying inferences about the value of the 
state variables is ambiguous (or imprecise). This paper presents a software tool that 
can aid in the making of decisions in these types of situations. It does this by allowing 
people at a low cost to incorporate ambiguity they might have about the probabilistic 
information they are using to make inferences about the state variables of interest into 
the decisions they ultimately make. 
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Appendix  
 
The following is a verbatim reproduction of the Mathematica code. The notebook and 
source code are available on request. An interactive user-friendly Mathematica Player 
file can be found at http://uctv.canterbury.ac.nz/post/4/1049 and the freely 
downloadable Mathematica Player to run the interactive demonstration can be 
obtained at: http://www.wolfram.com/products/player/download.cgi 
 
bayes2x2graphictablev2(*create grid with table at top and  two geometric 
specifications of 2x2 prob distributions, one a benchmark for comparison 
purposes*)[sens_,sensbm_(*bm denotes benchmark for a 
variable*),spec_(*this variable "spec" is actually 1-specificty as it is usually 
understood, ie it is P (D|S=0), not 1-P (D|S=0)*),specbm_(*this variable is 
actually 1-specificty, ie it is P (D|S=0), not 1-P 
(D|S=0)*),base_,basebm_,nobs_]:= 
Module[{x,y,m,b,jline,jline3,inverseprob,inverseprobbm,basediagnostic,inverseprobg
ivennotDbm,basediagnosticbm,inverseprobgivennotD,definettiplot,truthtablepl
ot,refinement}, 
   
(*Define two linear functions *) 
jline[y1_,y0_,x_]:=m x +b/.Flatten[Solve[{y1==m 1+b,y0==m 
0+b},{m,b}]](*jline[y1_,y0_,x_]is the equation for line going through (1,y1) 
and (0,y0)*); 
jline3[pt0_,pt1_,x_]:=m x +b/.Flatten[Solve[{pt1[[2]]==m pt1[[1]]+b,pt0[[2]]==m 
pt0[[1]]+b},{m,b}]](*"equation for a line from pt0, a 2 tuple, to pt1, a 2 
tuple*); 
   
(*construct nardinal P (D), for benchmark and selection*) 
basediagnostic=sens*base+(spec(*this variable is actually 1-specificty, ie it is P 
(D|S=0), not 1-P (D|S=0)*))*(1-base); 
basediagnosticbm=sensbm*basebm+(specbm)*(1-basebm); 
(*calculate P (S|D=1) ie calculate the inversep probs and store the values for the 
origial and the benchmark *) 
inverseprob= base*sens/basediagnostic; 
inverseprobbm= basebm*sensbm/basediagnosticbm; 
(*calculate P (S|D=0)*) 
inverseprobgivennotD= base*(1-sens)/(1-basediagnostic); 
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inverseprobgivennotDbm= basebm*(1-sensbm)/(1-basediagnosticbm); 
   
(* construct the basic graphic element*) 
definettiplot= 
Plot[{(*line through (1,sensitivity) and (0,1-specificty)*) jline[sens, spec,x], 
(*inverse prob line*)jline3[{inverseprob,1},{base,jline[sens,spec, base]},x], 
(*ditto for the benchmark specifications*)jline[sensbm,specbm,x], jline3[ 
{inverseprobbm,1},{basebm,jline[sensbm,specbm,basebm]},x](*tooltips 
removed*)},{x,0,1}, 
PlotStyle→{{Red,Thick,Dashing[{0.05,0.02}],Opacity[0.5]},{Blue,Thick,Dashing 
[{0.03,0.03}],Opacity[0.5]},{Red,Thick,Dotted},{Blue,Thick,Dotted}}, 
PlotRange→{{0,1.0},{0,1}},  
AspectRatio→1, 
ImageSize→350, 
PlotRangeClipping→False, 
FrameLabel→{ 
Text[Style["Probabilities for S ",Blue,FontFamily→"Verdana",Italic,10,Bold ]], 
Text[Style["Probabilities for D ",Red,FontFamily→"Verdana",Italic,10,Bold]] }, 
Frame→True, 
FrameStyle→{Directive[Blue,"Label",Bold],Directive[Red,"Label",Bold],Directive
[Blue,"Label",Bold],Directive[Red,"Label",Bold]}, 
GridLines→{{0.25,0.5,0.75},{0.25,0.5,0.75}},GridLinesStyle→Directive[Orange,Da
shed,Thickness[0.001]], 
Epilog→{ 
      (*inverse prob point top - a rectangle*) 
{Blue,Opacity[0.99],Rectangle[Offset[{2,2},{inverseprob,1}],Offset[{-15,-15}, 
{inverseprob,1}]]}, 
(*BM inverse prob point top- a rectangle with some opacity*) 
{Blue,Opacity[0.3],Rectangle[Offset[{2,2},{inverseprobbm,1}],Offset[{-10, 
-10},{inverseprobbm,1}]]}, 
      Text[ 
Style[TraditionalForm@ 
Row[{"P(S|D=1)"," = ",Round[inverseprob, If[nobs>100,0.001,0.01]]}], 
Blue,12], 
(*Sets the offset so that it depends on the value of the inverse probability*) 
If[inverseprob≤0.5,Offset[{35,-22},{inverseprob,1}],Offset[{-55,-22}, 
{inverseprob,1}]]], 
      (*inverse prob point bottom - its a rectangle with moderate opacity*) 
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      {Blue,Opacity[0.4],Rectangle[Offset[{-2,-2},{inverseprobgivennotD,0}], 
Offset[{15,15},{inverseprobgivennotD,0}]]}, 
 (*BM inverse prob point bottom*) 
{Blue,Opacity[0.2],Rectangle[Offset[{-2,-2},{inverseprobgivennotDbm,0}], 
Offset[{10,10},{inverseprobgivennotDbm,0}]]}, 
      Text[ 
Style[TraditionalForm@ 
Row[{" ",Round[inverseprobgivennotD,If[nobs>100,0.001,0.01]] 
}],Blue,12], 
If[inverseprobgivennotD≤0.5,Offset[{20,20},{inverseprobgivennotD,0}],Offs
et[{-15,20},{inverseprobgivennotD,0}]]], 
      (*Offset[{3,20},{inverseprobgivennotD,0}] *) 
(*baserate purple triangle*) 
{Purple,Opacity[0.99], 
Polygon[{Offset[{-7.5,0},{base,0}],Offset[{7.5,0},{base,0}],Offset[{0,15}, 
{base,0}]}]}, 
(*BM baserate opaque purple triangle*) 
{Purple,Opacity[0.3], 
Polygon[{Offset[{-7.5,0},{basebm,0}],Offset[{7.5,0},{basebm,0}],Offset[{0,15}, 
{basebm,0}]}]}, 
(*specificity*) 
{PointSize[0.05],Black,Opacity[0.99],Point[Offset[{0,0},{0,jline[sens,spec,0]}]]}, 
      (*BM specificity*) 
{PointSize[0.05],Gray,Opacity[0.4],Point[Offset[{0,0},{0,jline[sensbm,specbm,0] 
 }]]}, 
      (*intersection*) 
{PointSize[0.03],Black,Opacity[0.3],Point[Offset[{0,0},{base,jline[sens,spec,base 
 ]}]]}, 
(*BM intersection*) 
{PointSize[0.03],Gray,Opacity[0.3],Point[Offset[{0,0},{basebm,jline[sensbm, 
specbm,basebm]}]]}, 
      (*sensitivity*) 
{PointSize[0.05],Red,Point[Offset[{-2,-0},{1,jline[sens,spec,1]}]]}, 
      (*BM sensitivity*) 
{PointSize[0.05],Red,Opacity[0.3],Point[Offset[{-2,-0},{1,jline[sensbm, 
specbm,1]}]]}, 
      Text[ 
Style[TraditionalForm@ 
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Row[{"P(D|S=1)"," = ",Round[sens,If[nobs>100,0.001,0.01]]}],Red,12], 
 (*Sets the offset so that it depends on the value of the inverse probability*) 
If[sens≤0.9,Offset[{-60,-7},{1,sens}],Offset[{-60,-7},{1,sens}]]], 
(*vertical line through BM base rate, greyed out, facilitates P (S) vs P (S|D) 
comparison*) 
{Dotted,Gray,Line[{{base,1},{base,0}}]}, 
(*vertical line through base rate, greyed out, facilitates P (S) vs P (S|D) 
 comparison*) 
{Dashing[0.01],Black,Line[{{basebm,1},{basebm,0}}]}}]; 
 refinement=1;  
(*scale the base rate P (S) and the sensitivity and specificity to integers adding to nobs 
*) 
truthtableplot= 
Grid[ 
Join[ 
{{Text[Style["Truth Table and Natural Frequencies",Gray, 
FontFamily→"Verdana",Bold,Italic,12]],SpanFromLeft,SpanFromLeft}, 
{Text[Style["S",Black,FontFamily→"Verdana",Italic,11,Bold]],1,1,0,0," "}, 
{Text[Style["D",Black,FontFamily→"Verdana",Italic,11,Bold]], 
Item[1,Frame→{True,False,False,False}], 
Item[0,Frame→{True,False,False,False}], 
Item[1,Frame→{True,False,False,False}], 
Item[0,Frame→{True,False,False,False}]," "}}, 
{{Text[Style["Frequency",Black,FontFamily→"Verdana",Italic,11,Bold]], 
Style[Round[nobs*base*sens,refinement],Black,FontFamily→"Verdana",11,Bold]
, 
Style[Round[nobs*base*(1-sens),refinement],Black,FontFamily→"Verdana",11, 
Bold], 
Style[Round[nobs*(1-base)*(spec),refinement],Black,FontFamily→"Verdana",11, 
Bold], 
Style[Round[nobs*(1-base)*(1-spec),refinement],Black,FontFamily→"Verdana", 
 11,Bold], 
"total count" nobs},{" "," "," "," "," "," "}, 
{Text[Style["Graphics of Inverse Probabilities ■",Gray, 
FontFamily→"Verdana",Bold,Italic,12]],SpanFromLeft,SpanFromLeft}, 
{" "," "," "," "," "," "}, 
{definettiplot,SpanFromLeft,SpanFromLeft,SpanFromLeft}}], 
Dividers→{False,{False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,False,True}}, 
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Spacings→{Automatic,0.2}, 
ItemSize→Full]; 
truthtableplot 
] 
 
Manipulate[ 
bayes2x2graphictablev2[sens,sensbm,1-spec,1-specbm,base,basebm,nobs], 
{{nobs,100,Style["Total count •",Bold]},{100,1000,10000}},Delimiter, 
Style["Your selection of Natural Frequencies",Bold,11], 
{{base,0.2,Style["base rate ▲",Bold]},0.001,0.999,Appearance→"Labeled"}, 
{{sens,0.8,Style["sensitivity ●",Bold]},0.001,0.999,Appearance→"Labeled"}, 
{{spec,0.7,Style["specificity ●",Bold]},0.001,0.999,Appearance→"Labeled"}, 
 Delimiter, 
Style["Benchmark (BM) choices - lighter",Bold,11], 
{{basebm,0.2,Style["BM base rate ▲",Bold]},0.001,0.999, 
Appearance→"Labeled"}, 
{{sensbm,0.8,Style["BM sensitivity ●",Bold]},0.001,0.999, 
Appearance→"Labeled"}, 
{{specbm,0.7,Style["BM specificity ●",Bold]},0.001,0.999, 
Appearance→"Labeled"}, 
 ControlPlacement→Top, 
 SaveDefinitions→True] 
 
 
 
